Was Brentano an Early Deflationist about Truth?

The Monist 100 (1):1-14 (2017)
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Abstract

It is often assumed that deflationist accounts of truth are a product of philosophy of logic and language in the twentieth century. In this paper I show why this assumption is historically short-sighted. An early version of deflationism about truth can already be found in Brentano’s 1889 lecture “On the Concept of Truth.” That Brentano is a precursor of deflationism has gone largely unnoticed because of a different reception of his lecture: according to most scholars, Brentano proposes in it a revision of the correspondence theory of truth that he later rejected in favour of an epistemic theory. Contrary to this received interpretation, I argue that Brentano actually tried to show how one can minimize an account of truth without thereby sacrificing a robust realist intuition about the objectivity of truth. Brentano held on to this deflationist view in his later years, when he assigned self-evident judgments a primary role in our understanding of truth.

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Johannes Brandl
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Semantics and Truth.Jan Woleński - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Franz Brentano.Wolfgang Huemer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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