Revision by Comparison

Artificial Intelligence 157 (1):5-47 (2004)
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Abstract

Since the early 1980s, logical theories of belief revision have offered formal methods for the transformation of knowledge bases or “corpora” of data and beliefs. Early models have dealt with unconditional acceptance and integration of potentially belief-contravening pieces of information into the existing corpus. More recently, models of “non-prioritized” revision were proposed that allow the agent rationally to refuse to accept the new information. This paper introduces a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of propositions. Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. We use reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of information. We provide two kinds of semantics for this idea, give a logical characterization of the new model, study its relation with other operations of belief revision and contraction, and discuss its intuitive strengths and weaknesses.

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Author Profiles

Hans Rott
Universität Regensburg
Eduardo Fermé
University of Madeira

Citations of this work

Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-seven Iterated Theory Change Operators.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Jacek Malinowski David Makinson & Wansing Heinrich (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy. Springer. pp. 269–296.
Logic of belief revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.

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