On the logic of iterated belief revision

Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not necessarily captured by a belief set. We also show that a simple modification to the AGM framework can allow belief revision to be a function of epistemic states. We establish a model-based representation theorem which characterizes the proposed postulates and constrains, in turn, the way in which entrenchment orderings may be transformed under iterated belief revision.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,408

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Distance semantics for belief revision.Daniel Lehmann, Menachem Magidor & Karl Schlechta - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):295-317.
Transmission Failure, AGM Style.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs.Craig Boutilier - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
Belief revision in a temporal framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Resource-bounded belief revision and contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-07-31

Downloads
99 (#158,319)

6 months
12 (#120,166)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?