Reconsidering the Role of Bridge Laws In Inter-Theoretical Reductions
Erkenntnis 71 (3):303-322 (2009)
Abstract
The present paper surveys the three most prominent accounts in contemporary debates over how sound reduction should be executed. The classical Nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target-theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises (so-called bridge laws) connecting the entities of the target and the base theory. The functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base entities. The new-wave model of reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it, which remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory. One of the fundamental motivations of both the functional and the new-wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded. The present paper argues that bridge laws—in the original Nagelian sense—are inevitable, i.e. that none of these models can evade them. On the one hand, the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws, since its fundamental concept, functionalization, is an inter-theoretical process dealing with entities of two different theories. Theoretical entities of different theories (in a general heterogeneous case) do not have common causal relations, so the functionalization of an entity—without bridge laws—can only be executed in the framework of its own theory. On the other hand, the so-called images of the new-wave account cannot be constructed without the use of bridge laws. These connecting principles are needed to guide the process of deduction within the base theory; without them one would not be able to recognize if the deduced structure was an image of the target theory.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10670-009-9181-y
My notes
Similar books and articles
Does functional reduction need bridge laws? A response to Marras.Kevin Morris - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.
Mapping the mind: bridge laws and the psycho-neural interface.Marco J. Nathan & Guillermo Del Pinal - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):637-657.
Associative Bridge Laws and the Psycho-Neural Interface.Guillermo Del Pinal & Marco J. Nathan - unknown
On the Role of Bridge Laws in Intertheoretic Relations.Sorin Bangu - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1108-1119.
Themes in my philosophical work.Terence E. Horgan - 2002 - In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 1-26.
Administrative Decision Making in Response to Sudden Health Care Agency Funding Reductions: is there a role for ethics?Donna M. Wilson - 1998 - Nursing Ethics 5 (4):319-329.
Principles, laws, theories and the metaphysics of science.Craig Dilworth - 1994 - Synthese 101 (2):223 - 247.
“Counting As” a Bridge Principle: Against Searle Against Social-Scientific Laws.William Butchard & Robert D’Amico - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (4):455-469.
Are Conservation Laws Metaphysically Necessary?Johanna Wolff - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):898-906.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-07-04
Downloads
115 (#110,186)
6 months
3 (#226,335)
2009-07-04
Downloads
115 (#110,186)
6 months
3 (#226,335)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Scientific Reduction.Raphael van Riel & Robert Van Gulick - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nagelian Reduction Beyond the Nagel Model.Raphael van Riel - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):353-375.
Causation at different levels: tracking the commitments of mechanistic explanations.Peter Fazekas & Gergely Kertész - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (3):365-383.
Nagel on reduction.Sahotra Sarkar - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:43-56.
The Future of Cognitive Neuroscience? Reverse Inference in Focus.Marco J. Nathan & Guillermo Del Pinal - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12427.
References found in this work
Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind–body problem and mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - New York, NY, USA: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Aspects of scientific explanation.Carl G. Hempel - 1965 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press. pp. 504.