Does functional reduction need bridge laws? A response to Marras

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657 (2009)
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Abstract

In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws. Introduction Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws Marras on Functional Reduction The Logical Space of ‘Bridge Law’ Views of Reduction [RP] as an Account of Realization Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

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Kevin Morris
Tulane University

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Guidelines for theorizing about realization.Kevin Morris - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
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