8 found
See also
  1. Who’s Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):393-412.
    We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.
    Direct download (12 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  2. Confirmation and Reduction: a Bayesian Account.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):321-338.
    Various scientific theories stand in a reductive relation to each other. In a recent article, we have argued that a generalized version of the Nagel-Schaffner model (GNS) is the right account of this relation. In this article, we present a Bayesian analysis of how GNS impacts on confirmation. We formalize the relation between the reducing and the reduced theory before and after the reduction using Bayesian networks, and thereby show that, post-reduction, the two theories are confirmatory of each other. We (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  3.  73
    The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):257-283.
    Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities and recover the Born rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine one of the axioms (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  4.  16
    Neo-Nagelian reduction: a statement, defence, and application.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani - 2011 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    The thesis proposes, defends, and applies a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, called "Neo-Nagelian" reduction. There are numerous accounts of inter-theoretic reduction in the philosophy of science literature but the most well-known and widely-discussed is the Nagelian one. In the thesis I identify various kinds of problems which the Nagelian model faces. Whilst some of these can be resolved, pressing ones remain. In lieu of the Nagelian model, other models of inter-theoretic reduction have been proposed, chief amongst which are so-called (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  41
    The Aharonov Approach to Equilibrium.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):976-988.
    Using the 'Aharonov approach', Linden and colleagues purportedly prove that reaching equilibrium is a universal property of quantum systems. Such a proof would constitute a very significant result in the foundations of statistical mechanics. I argue that, as it stands, this proof is not sound. However, based on the their theorems, I construct an argument for the conclusion that an arbitrary small subsystem of a large quantum system typically tends toward and remains in, or close to, equilibrium. This is the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  49
    Why I Am Not an Everettian.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 219--228.
  7. Mauricio Suárez, ed. 2011. Probabilities, Causes, and Propensities in Physics.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (2):339-342.
  8.  52
    Lewis' Account of Counterfactuals is Incongruent with Lewis' Account of Laws of Nature.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani & Seamus Bradley - unknown
    In this paper we argue that there is a problem with the conjunction of David Lewis' account of counterfactual conditionals and his account of laws of nature. This is a pressing problem since both accounts are individually plausible, and popular.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation