Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs

Philosophy of Science 89 (4):661-682 (2022)
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Abstract

According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder, mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. This article argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by introducing the “natural dysfunction analysis” of disorder, before outlining the AAMD. I then analyze the necessary conditions for realizer autonomous dysfunction. Building on this, I show that software functions disassociate from hardware functions in a way that mental functions do not disassociate from brain functions. It follows that mental disorders are brain disorders necessarily.

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Harriet Fagerberg
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Are mental disorders brain disorders? – A precis.Anneli Jefferson - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):552-557.
Brain dysfunction without function.Harriet Fagerberg - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):570-582.
En contra del compromiso causal de la psiquiatría biológica.Rafael Ambríz González - 2023 - Aporía. International Journal for Philosophical Investigations 4 (Especial):141-162.

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Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter.Justin Garson - 2019 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Second Rebuttal On Health.Christopher Boorse - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):683-724.

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