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Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: A critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)
Psychological Review 112 (4):1040-1052 (2005)
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Citations of this work
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.
Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Simon Stephan & Michael R. Waldmann - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 1 (12):2472-2505.
References found in this work
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller - 1986 - Psychological Review 93 (2):136-153.
Rationality in reasoning: The problem of deductive competence.Jonathan Evans & David E. Over - unknown - Current Psychology of Cognition 16 (1-2):3-38.
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):565-570.
The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey, R. B. Braithwaite & G. E. Moore - 1931 - Mind 40 (160):476-482.
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