Analysis 79 (2):193-202 (2019)

Authors
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Abstract
A compelling requirement on normative theories is that they should be satisfiable, that is, in every possible choice situation with a finite number of alternatives, there should be at least one performable act such that, if one were to perform that act, one would comply with the theory. In this paper, I argue that, given some standard assumptions about free will and counterfactuals, Objective Act Consequentialism violates this requirement.
Keywords Act Consequentialism  satisfiability  moral dilemmas  soft determinism  counterfactuals  normative invariance
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any026
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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Citations of this work BETA

Utilitarianism Without Moral Aggregation.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):256-269.

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