Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):108-118 (2016)

Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrongness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act's consequences are compared with those of its alternatives and in part on how difficult it is to perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories. The first is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better consequences than some alternative act, then it is not more wrong than the alternative act. The second is consequentialist supervenience, which says that, if two acts have equally good consequences in a situation, then they have the same deontic status in the situation. And the third is consequentialist continuity, which says that, for every act and for any difference in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the consequences of the act which would, other things being equal, not change the wrongness of that act or any alternative by more than δ. I defend a proposal that satisfies these conditions.
Keywords consequentialist supervenience  degrees of wrongness  consequentialism  consequentialist dominance  consequentialist continuity  easiness  difficulty
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.200
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald H. Regan - 1980 - Oxford University Press.

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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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