Gluckman versus Frazer: if-I-were-a-horse arguments

Abstract

I present anthropologist Max Gluckman’s explanation of what “if-I-were-a-horse” arguments are and introduce three questions. How do we define this kind of argument? Are earlier anthropologists “guilty” of them? And is it a bad idea to make them? I address the first two questions, proposing that Frazer is not much guilty of precisely these, though his project calls for them.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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