This essay argues against the standard reading of Mencius that the emotions are perfectible or that they require perfecting in order to render a person virtuous. Rejecting this perfectibility reading allows us to explore two interesting philosophical points: (1) we can give an account of moral virtue and moral development that is significantly different from broadly Aristotelian accounts and that provides a psychologically realistic model of the Mencian sage; and (2) this account introduces a conception of emotional engagement as active (...) and under a person's control. (shrink)

In an award-winning essay, Shu-Shan L ee discusses scholarly commentary about obedience to the emperor, focusing on public and hidden records of protest. The thesis of Lee’s essay is that the relationship between authority and subject in imperial Confucianism was built on a conditional obligation of obedience, despite traditional accounts of it as absolute. On his account, the obligation of obedience should be conceived through the rubric of imperial Confucianism as being conditional on fulfillment of reciprocal obligations. As part of (...) my response, I suggest that there is a third way to understand the obligation of obedience through the Confucian lens, which is less transactional than reciprocal obligation, while also providing a plausible alternative to absolute obligation as the correct understanding of imperial Confucian thinking about obedience to the emperor. (shrink)

In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is 'internally' available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart-mind. Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of (...) 'internal' justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi. (shrink)

Early Confucian thought is still not completely understood. This is particularly so, I argue, in the case of Mencius , who was the first prominent follower of Confucius. I present a new reading of this early figure. ;The key problem in traditional analyses is in attributing to Mencius the view that a person's motivational capacities, especially her emotions, require cultivation in order for her to act and feel correctly. That reading, combined with certain important passages of the text, make it (...) seem that Mencius is quite simply confused. For he seems in those passages to exhort people to do and feel what is right even though it is clear that they lack the kind of cultivation Mencius's view supposedly requires. What is more, he quite obviously expects such people to be able immediately to do and feel what is right. ;Once we leave the cultivation reading behind, I argue, pieces of Mencius's fall into place and a more or less systematic ethical theory begins to form. Far from being confused, I argue, Mencius combines a psychologically realistic account of the morally virtuous person, i.e. one which recognizes human limitations with respect to our emotional lives, with a plausible account of the control that we have and the responsibility that we bear for how we feel or don't feel toward one another. (shrink)

In this article I argue against Chad Hansen’s version of the “White Horse Dialogue” (Baimalun) of Gongsun Longzi as intelligible through writings of the later Moists. Hansen regards the Baimalun as an attempt to demonstrate how the compound baima, “white horse,” is correctly analyzed in one of the Moist ways of analyzing compound term semantics but not the other. I present an alternative reading in which the Baimalun arguments point out, via reductio, the failure of either Moist analysis; in particular (...) they point out how neither analysis accounts for ordinary, acceptable inferences like “There is a white horse; therefore there is a horse.” At issue for Gongsun Longzi is a fundamental problem with atomic terms: none of them seems capable of referring to a particular, “stand-alone” individual. (shrink)

My response to Stephen C. Angle focuses on his question: “Can the People (_min_ 民) ever grow up?” I conclude that the people-centered approach developed in “What Did the Emperor Ever Say?” (Lee 2020 ) does not rule out the idea of commoners becoming politically mature. With its focus on textual evidence specifically addressing the commoners and with its attentiveness to their political agency in historical China, the approach has the potential to help scholars find room for a more progressive (...) theory in the Confucian tradition. In response to Manyul I m, I clarify the meaning of paternalistic gratitude, specifying it as a reciprocal obligation toward the nontransactional benevolence received from the emperor. I then critically examine Im’s nonreciprocal theory of existential obligation. I argue that the existential obligation, as defined by Im, presents no check on an abusive relationship and therefore cannot withstand the test of textual evidence. Upon reflection, I conclude that the theory of paternalistic gratitude remains a plausible understanding of Confucian political obligation. For one, it accurately reflects the Confucian reciprocal idea that the commoners’ political obligation is conditional upon the ruler’s noncontractual benevolence. For another, it contains the feature of endurance which, as Im reminds us, is an essence in the parent-child relation and its political application. (shrink)

This essay elaborates on my essay, “Confucius’ Complaints and the Analects’ Account of the Good Life,” responding to issues and criticisms raised by Michael Ing and Manyul Im. Ing’s and Im’s critiques most invite reflection on regret, both as it might situate in Confucius’ own life and as it could feature more broadly in developed moral maturity. I consider two modes of regret: regret concerning compromises of conscience and end-of-life regret. The latter can naturally include elements of the former, (...) but may nonetheless have special features not exhausted by it. I argue that the model of Confucius is consistent with versions of both of these forms of regret while also acknowledging that where the Analects is concerned, much of what we might say about regret will inevitably be somewhat speculative. The essay thus dwells in some of the ambiguities suggested by the Analects. (shrink)

1. Sŏŏn -- 2. Illyu sahoe ŭi tangmyŏn kwaje -- 3. 'Kŭllobŏl ch'ŏrhak (Global Philosophy)' ŭrosŏ sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) -- 4. Sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) ŭi kyŏngje ch'ŏrhak kwa kyŏngje ironjŏk mohyŏng -- 5. Sinsiryongjuŭi ŭi 'ch'ŏngsajin’ -- 6. Sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) wa Miguk, Chungguk siryongjuŭi ŭi ch'aichŏm -- 7. Sinsiryongjuŭi (Neopragmatism) wa Marŭk'ŭsijŭm (Marxism) ŭi ch'aichŏm -- 8. Han'guk sahoe e taehan Sinsiryongjuŭi chŏgyong -- 9. Yoyak mit kyŏllon.

How can businesses and business leaders contribute to solutions of the big ethical, social, and ecological challenges of today? Within this context this book offers theoretical and practical approaches to making the world a better place for existing and future generations. It uses diverse, often multidimensional frames of reference and illustrates them with real-life cases to show positive solutions. The author's broad professional background and humanistic worldview are reflected in his application of psychological and virtue-oriented theories as well as philosophical (...) approaches. Some of the articles have an essay format, others share his experiences and experiments in his ethics classes using roleplays to cultivate empathic and prudent ethical behaviour. A primary motivation of the book is to inspire leaders as well as teachers and students of leadership and business by enriching their worldviews to see ethics as a fundamental aspect at all levels of economic activity. (shrink)

Die Beiträge in diesem Buch sind in transkultureller Perspektive Problemen der Epistemologie, der Anthropologie, der Ethik und der politischen Philosophie gewidmet. Unter dem Titel Menschsein - On Being Human diskutieren koreanische und deutsche Philosophen Themen der einen Welt: Universale und lokale Diskurse über Kultur und Transkulturalität im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, die Rolle der Religionen, öffentliche Rationalität, transkulturelle Gerechtigkeit und Universalität von Menschenrechten. The contributions in this book are from a transcultural perspective and devoted to problems in epistemology, anthropology, ethics and (...) political philosophy. Under the title Menschsein - On Being Human, Korean and German philosophers discuss topics to do with one world: universal and local discourses about culture and transculturality in the age of globalization, the role of religion, public rationality, transcultural justice, and the universality of human rights. (shrink)

With cutting-edge insights from leading European and North American scholars, this authoritative book addresses the fundamental problems of business in an age of crisis whilst presenting radical, but practical, solutions. The contributors explore three main value shifts: from inequality to equality, from the technical-materialistic to the ecological-spiritual, and from compliance and enforcement to autonomy and responsibility. A number of striking issues are addressed including the doctrine of self-interest, the purpose of business, codes of conduct, personal responsibility, existential perspectives on business (...) ethics and the development of ethical competence. This book will be an essential point of reference for academic researchers and postgraduate students in business ethics and corporate social responsibility, as well as practitioners interested in the relevance of business ethics to leadership, management, strategy and finance. (shrink)

1. T. Isaak Iselins Leben und Bildungsgang bis 1764.--2. T. Iselins Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des XVII. Jahrhunderts.