Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy

New York: Routledge. Edited by Heather Dyke (2007)
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Abstract

This book is an investigation into metaphysics: its aims, scope, methodology and practice. Dyke argues that metaphysics should take itself to be concerned with investigating the fundamental nature of reality, and suggests that the ontological significance of language has been grossly exaggerated in the pursuit of that aim.

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Heather Dyke
University of Otago

Citations of this work

Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Realism.Alexandern D. Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Taking taniwha seriously.Justine Kingsbury - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-15.
The location of pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.

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