The papers in this volume reflect much of the current unease of a world that perceives itself once more at the edge of chaos. The authors present different vistas of that experience and their inherent dialectic, expressed in numerous and ceaseless conflicts between ordering and disordering processes. They can be read as comments on the ongoing processes that lead toward greater complexity.

In the article the fundamental graphic models that are used by the cultural consciousness to bring about the abstract spheres of thought are analyzed. The problem of inter-semiotic, i.e. emblematic, interpretation of the categories of space and time is also considered. The models of the cross and pyramid are analyzed from the point of view of their ideological (transcending) function and of the mechanism of emblematizing the abstract notions of time and space. This approach helps understanding the general (...) laws of cultural mentality and the process of emblematizing any meaning for the structuring and fixation purposes. (shrink)

Or better: time asymmetry in thermodynamics. Better still: time asymmetry in thermodynamic phenomena. “Time in thermodynamics” misleadingly suggests that thermodynamics will tell us about the fundamental nature of time. But we don’t think that thermodynamics is a fundamental theory. It is a theory of macroscopic behavior, often called a “phenomenological science.” And to the extent that physics can tell us about the fundamental features of the world, including such things as the nature of time, we (...) generally think that only fundamental physics can. On its own, a science like thermodynamics won’t be able to tell us about time per se. But the theory will have much to say about everyday processes that occur in time; and in particular, the apparent asymmetry of those processes. The pressing question of time in the context of thermodynamics is about the asymmetry of things in time, not the asymmetry of time, to paraphrase Price ( , ). I use the title anyway, to underscore what is, to my mind, the centrality of thermodynamics to any discussion of the nature of time and our experience in it. The two issues—the temporal features of processes in time, and the intrinsic structure of time itself—are related. Indeed, it is in part this relation that makes the question of time asymmetry in thermodynamics so interesting. This, plus the fact that thermodynamics describes a surprisingly wide range of our ordinary experience. We’ll return to this. First, we need to get the question of time asymmetry in thermodynamics out on the table. (shrink)

Future-biased individuals systematically prefer positively valenced events to be in the future (positive future-bias) and negatively valenced events to be in the past (negative future-bias). The most extreme form of future-bias is absolute future-bias, whereby we completely discount the value of past events when forming our preferences. Various authors have thought that we are absolutely future-biased (Sullivan (2018:58); Parfit (1984:173) and that future-bias (absolute or otherwise) is at least rationally permissible (Prior (1959), Hare (2007; 2008), Kauppinen (2018), Heathwood (2008)). The (...) permissibility of future-bias is often held to be grounded in the structure of the temporal dimension. In this paper I consider several proposals for grounding the permissibility of such preferences and evaluate these in the light of the preferences we would have, and judge that we should have, in various time-travel scenarios. I argue that what we learn by considering these scenarios is that these preferences really have nothing to do with temporal structure. So if something grounds their permissibility, it is not temporal structure. (shrink)

This paper argues for the following disjunction: either we do not live in a world with a branching temporal structure, or backwards time travel is nomologically impossible, given the initial state of the universe, or backwards time travel to our space-time location is impossible given large-scale facts about space and time. A fortiori, if backwards time travel to our location is possible, we do not live in a branching universe.

The last two decades have seen a dramatic increase in scientific publications on Tourette syndrome, but the etiology of this common neurodevelopmental condition is still unknown. Many questions remain—about the unitary nature of the syndrome, and the criteria used to define it in such internationally accepted manuals as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the International Classification of Disorders. Meanwhile, individuals and families affected by TS remain underserviced, as pharmacological and behavioral therapies provide relief for some but (...) not all who need support. We urgently need new... (shrink)

Kant's concept of time forms an integral part of his mature system of transcendental idealism. That system is a critical response to his predecessors' treatments of time and related issues. Hence, a proper assessment of Kant's understanding of time requires an elaboration of its distinctive historical and systematic matrix. The aim of the dissertation is to examine critically Kant's mature conception of time in light of both the historical factors that shaped it and the role it (...) plays in Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism. ;The most important discussion shaping Kant's thought on time is the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence . The relevance of the Correspondence to Kant's mature view of time has, however, been overlooked by many commentators. The reason for this neglect can be traced in part to a misinterpretation of the question underlying the first antinomy in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason . According to that misinterpretation, the first antinomy revolves around the question whether time itself is finite or infinite. The correction of this mistaken, but common interpretation paves the way for a main task of this dissertation, namely, to reconstruct with historical and systematic accuracy the relation between the issue in the Correspondence underlying the first antinomy and Kant's concept of time. ;The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter One examines the particular issue discussed in the Correspondence which had the greatest impact on Kant's notion of time, namely, the question whether time is absolute, as Clarke and the Newtonians held, or whether it is relational, as Leibniz held. Chapter Two explores how the concept of time in Kant's "Inaugural Dissertation" is influenced by this dispute between Leibniz and Clarke. Chapter Three considers the concept of time and its role in Kant's fully developed transcendental idealism, as articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. Particular attention is paid to the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and the first antinomy. Finally, Chapter Four critically examines a central assumption of Kant's concept of time that he shares with his predecessors: the infinity of time. It is argued that this assumption overlooks the metaphysical significance of the "moving" present. (shrink)