Philosophy of Science 55 (2):272-279 (1988)
AbstractThe current project of "naturalizing" epistemology has left epistemologists with a plethora of theories alleged to fall under that rubric. Recent epistemic justification theorists have seemed to want to focus on theories of epistemic justification that are more contextualized (naturalized) and less normatively global than those of the past. This paper has two central arguments: (i) that if justification is seen from a naturalized standpoint, more attention to the actual process of epistemic justification might be in order (and, hence, that the justificatory set might come to be seen more descriptively and less normatively), and (ii) that if any theory of epistemic justification were to be normatively accurate, regardless of the size of its justificatory set, then one of the requirements upon it might well be that key terms in the set would refer, in the spirit of the new scientific realism. The central thesis of the paper relies on the normative/descriptive distinction as applicable to epistemic justification theory and also relies on an intuitively plausible account of the process of epistemic justification as engaged in by an epistemic agent and skeptical challenger
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence.Richard Boyd - 1973 - Noûs 7 (1):1-12.
A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification.David B. Annis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
Similar books and articles
Epistemic Responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Deontic Vs. Nondeontic Conceptions of Epistemic Justification.H. Vahid - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (3):285-301.
Epistemic Justification and Psychological Realism.James E. Taylor - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230.
Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma.Colin Ruloff - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: A Problem for Coherentism. [REVIEW]Richard Schantz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):177-191.
Justification À la Mode and Justification Simpliciter.Jane Duran - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (2):178-191.