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Refocusing the question: Can there be skillful coping without propositional representations or brain representations? [Book Review]
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):413-25 (2002)
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Refocusing the question: Can there be skillful coping without propositional representations or brain representations?Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):413-425.
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The phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-induced changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients: An enactive affordance-based model.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action.Michael Brownstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.
Agency From a Radical Embodied Standpoint: An Ecological-Enactive Proposal.Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11 (1319).
Gendered affordance perception and unequal domestic labour.Tom McClelland & Paulina Sliwa - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2):501-524.
Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.
References found in this work
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being in Time, Division I.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Bradford.
Demonstrative Concepts and Experience.Sean Dorrance Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):397-420.
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