Epicurean equanimity towards death

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):92–114 (2004)
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This paper assesses two reformulations of Epicurus' argument that "death ... is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present; and whenever death is present, we do not exist." The first resembles many contemporary reformulations in that it attempts to reach the conclusion that death is not to the disadvantage of its subject. I argue that this rather anachronistic sort of reformulation cannot succeed. The second reformulation stays closer to the spirit of Epicurus' actual position on death by attempting to reach the conclusion that it is inappropriate to fear or dread or have any other negative affective response towards death. I raise a plausible objection to this argument, suggesting that dissatisfaction is sometimes an appropriate response to the approach of death. I then go on to consider the possibility that Epicurus was partly right in that it may always be inappropriate to dread death



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Kaila Draper
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

A dilemma for Epicureanism.Travis Timmerman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):241-257.
Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
Desire satisfaction, death, and time.Duncan Purves - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):799-819.

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