Authors
Christopher Wareham
University of Witwatersrand
Abstract
Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against the deprivation account and argue that this response to Epicurus’s argument is successful once it has been sufficiently clarified.
Keywords death  deprivation account  Epicurus  ethics  hedonism  value of life
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DOI 10.4314/sajpem.v28i2.46685
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Events.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

Between Hoping to Die and Longing to Live Longer.Christopher S. Wareham - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (2):1-20.
What is the Ethics of Ageing?Christopher Simon Wareham - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (2):128-132.
Genome Editing for Longer Lives: The Problem of Loneliness.C. S. Wareham - 2020 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17 (2):309-314.
Better to Return Whence We Came.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (1):85-100.

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