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Causes, objects, and producers of the emotions
Journal of Philosophy 67 (November):947-950 (1970)
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Citations of this work
Can Emotions Have Abstract Objects? The Example of Awe.Fredericks Rachel - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):733-746.
Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes?Anders Nes - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
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