True emotions

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers widely agree that emotions may have or lack appropriateness or fittingness, which in the emotional domain is an analogue of truth. I defend de Sousa's account of emotional truth by arguing that emotions have cognitive content as digitalized evaluative perceptions of the particular object of emotion, in terms of the relevant formal property. I argue that an emotion is true if and only if there is an actual fit between the particular and the formal objects of emotion, and the emotion's propositional content is semantically satisfied, or the target of the emotion exists. Emotions meet the syntactic and disciplinary requirements of minimally truth-apt states. Appropriate fit occurs when lower-level properties of particular objects of emotion provide sufficient warrant to make ascription of the relevant formal properties superassertable.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,764

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Narcissism in emotion.David Pugmire - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):313-326.
The conceptual framework for the investigation of emotions.P. M. S. Hacker - 2009 - In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave-Macmillan.
The conceptual framework for the investigation of the emotions.Peter M. S. Hacker - 2004 - International Review of Psychiatry 16 (3):199-208.
Emotional Truth.Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247-275.
Emotion Explained.Edmund T. Rolls - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
139 (#121,488)

6 months
7 (#174,092)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions.Andrea Scarantino - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):729-768.
Emotions about Emotions.Dina Mendonça - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (4):390-396.
A new role for emotions in epistemology.Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle - 2008 - In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. pp. 1--31.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
What an emotion is: A sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.
Explaining action by emotion.Sabine A. Döring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
Emotion and moral judgment.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):104–124.

View all 10 references / Add more references