Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801 (2015)

Authors
Oisín Deery
York University
Abstract
Standard methods in experimental philosophy have sought to measure folk intuitions using experiments, but certain limitations are inherent in experimental methods. Accordingly, we have designed the Free-Will Intuitions Scale to empirically measure folk intuitions relevant to free-will debates using a different method. This method reveals what folk intuitions are like prior to participants' being put in forced-choice experiments. Our results suggest that a central debate in the experimental philosophy of free will—the “natural” compatibilism debate—is mistaken in assuming that folk intuitions are exclusively either compatibilist or incompatibilist. They also identify a number of important new issues in the empirical study of free-will intuitions
Keywords Compatibilism  Free will  Experimental philosophy
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.893868
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References found in this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Abstract.[author unknown] - 2011 - Dialogue and Universalism 21 (4):9-9.

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Citations of this work BETA

Free Actions as a Natural Kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.
Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.
Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment.Eddy Nahmias - 2016 - In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Oxford University Press.

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