Abstract

There have in recent years been various indications of dissatisfaction with certain trends in current Oxford and Cambridge philosophy. There has been a feeling that detailed analyses of minute particulars has led to neglect of some broader and more pervasive issues. It has been realised that certain problems are distorted when isolated for analytic purposes from their living context. Thus, the problem of the self has been treated exclusively as a logical, linguistic or epistemological problem, without reference to the awareness of self in moral experience. The problems of self-consciousness, of personal identity and of memory have been treated as cognitive problems, without reference to action, intention or project as modes of experience of self-continuity through time. In general, philosophy of mind has been separated from philosophy of morals. In turn, philosophy of morals has been developed as if it had to do with ‘stands’ or decisions not with reasoning; or as if it concerned the meaning of sentences, not the meaning of human life.