Abstract

Advocates of the so-called New Hume maintain that, contrary to the traditional interpretation, Hume is neither a non-cognitivist nor a moral skeptic. Rather, if these philosophers are correct, Hume is a sentimentalist who defends views very similar to Hutcheson’s. Reid’s attack on Hume’s moral philosophy, however, depends on an interpretation according to which Hume is a non-cognitivist and a moral skeptic. Does this mean that, if advocates of the New Hume are correct, Reid’s objections to Hume entirely fail to make contact with Hume’s views? This chapter argues that, even if proponents of the New Hume are correct, Reid raises objections that make contact with Hume’s views and are worth considering. These objections concern how to square Hume’s commitment to hedonism and rule-utilitarianism with very plausible principles of justice.