Philosophy of Science 44 (June):269-87 (1977)

Robert Cummins
University of California, Davis
The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are "internally represented," this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched in information processing terms may have an explanatory interest for a given range of behavior which is independent of physiological explanations of the same range of behavior
Keywords Behavior  Computer  Explanation  Physiology  Program  Science
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DOI 10.1086/288742
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References found in this work BETA

Functional Analysis.Robert Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
Behaviorism.John B. Watson - 1926 - Journal of Philosophy 23 (12):331-334.
The Philosophical Problem of Truth-Of.Robert Cummins - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):103 - 122.

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Citations of this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Intrinsic Intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
Computing Mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.

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