Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318 (2007)
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Abstract

By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.

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Andy Cullison
DePauw University

Citations of this work

What externalists should say about dry earth.Daniel Z. Korman - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.
Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self.Nora Berenstain - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:445-485.

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References found in this work

Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Content and self-knowledge.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
Empty names.David Braun - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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