Authors
Nora Berenstain
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Abstract
The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of the idealized rational self leads philosophers to underestimate the influence of implicit bias on their own judgments and prevents them from enacting the reforms necessary to minimize the effects of implicit bias on institutional decision-making procedures. I consider recent experiments in social psychology that suggest that an increased sense of one’s own objectivity leads to greater reliance on bias in hiring scenarios, and I hypothesize how these results might be applied to philosophers’ evaluative judgments. I discuss ways that the idealized rational self is susceptible to broader critiques of ideal theory, and I consider some of the ways that the picture functions as a tool of active ignorance and color-evasive racism.
Keywords rationality  objectivity  introspection  methodology  implicit bias  underrepresentation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.017
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.

View all 71 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Backlash: What Happens When We Talk Honestly About Racism in America by George Yancy.Tina Fernandes Botts - 2019 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 9 (1):166-173.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.
Ethnocentrism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Philosophy.Brian Bruya - 2017 - Philosophy East and West 67 (4):991-1018.
Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.
Collective Implicit Attitudes: A Stakeholder Conception of Implicit Bias.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-07-09

Total views
717 ( #10,280 of 2,499,419 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #14,554 of 2,499,419 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes