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Content and self-knowledge
Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26 (1989)
Abstract
This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational propertiesAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.
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