Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (6):558-576 (2008)

Disability activists' redefinition of “disability” as a social, rather than a medical, problem attempts to reassign causality. We explicate the untenable implications of this approach and argue this definition is maleficent, unjust, and inconsistent. Thus, redefining disability as a socially caused phenomenon is, from a moral point of view, ill-advised
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DOI 10.1093/jmp/jhn030
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References found in this work BETA

A Defense of Abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Abortion and Infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.
Saints and Heroes.J. O. Urmson - 1958 - In A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of Washington Press.
At the Margins of Moral Personhood.Eva Kittay - 2005 - Ethics 116 (1):100-131.

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Redefining Disability: A Rejoinder to a Critique.Solveig Magnus Reindal - 2010 - Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1 (1):125-135.

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