No Sour Grapes for Nietzsche

International Studies in Philosophy 25 (2):145-149 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Refutes the suggestion that Nietzsche's atheism is the result of sour grapes, i.e. his own failure to form a relationship with the divine, and argues that Nietzsche's rejection of sour grapes is, to the contrary, one of the best possible encapsulations of his philosophy.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

02705664

DOI

10.5840/intstudphil199325274

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,592

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
In defense of adaptive preferences.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.
Sour grapes: studies in the subversion of rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
Sour grapes, rational desires and objective consequentialism.M. Rickard - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (3):279 - 303.
J. ELSTER: "Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subversion of Rationality". [REVIEW]G. Boss - 1985 - Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 117:255.
ELSTER, J.: "Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality". [REVIEW]J. Bishop - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:245.
Sour grapes–utilitarianism and the genesis of wants. Sen A, Williams B.J. Elster - 1982 - In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press. pp. 219--238.
Sour Grapes, Self-Abnegation and Character Building.David Zimmerman - 2003 - The Monist 86 (2):220-241.
Utilitarianism and the genesis of wants.Jon Elster & Sour Grapes - 1982 - In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press. pp. 219--238.
Sour grapes and character planning.Luc Bovens - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):57-78.
Reasons for Preferences.Luc Bovens - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
Rational choice theory considered as psychology and moral philosophy.Philippe Mongin - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1):5-37.
Reply to Professor Anderson.Julian Young - 2011 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 42 (1):121-121.
Second Reply to Professor Anderson.Julian Young - 2012 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (2):362-365.
Reply to Professor Nowell‐Smith.R. M. Dworkin - 1978 - Philosophical Books 19 (1):8-9.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-02

Downloads
25 (#628,404)

6 months
1 (#1,469,469)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan R Cohen
Bates College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references