Abstract

The central thesis of this dissertation is that the so-called 'classical' approach to studying cognition should be replaced by a new kind of representationalist cognitive science. Combining Dennett's notion of 'tacit' representation with Pylyshyn's notion of 'functional architecture,' I argue for a new approach to cognition based on a broad understanding of computation and of representation. I also show that the basic idea of this dissertation--that cognitive architecture makes important contributions to cognition--is very closely related to Kant's theory of mind. ;Fodor's theory of cognition fails because it doesn't acknowledge the cognitive import of tacitly represented content found in the functional architecture of a system of representation. Fodor's problems arise due to the combination of a number of assumptions: first, that content and the vehicles which carry it are quite independent of each other; second, that the paradigm case of thought is sophisticated intellectual problem solving; third, that the structure must be reflected in the structure of the causes behaviour. Since Fodor's much vaunted 'systematicity' argument is simply a species of this latter kind of claim, it is also found wanting. ;Another fundamental problem for Fodor has been a misconception of computation as essentially involving meaning. This is a poor starting point if you don't have a clear notion of meaning. Computation is much more about syntactic manipulation than it is about semantics. I show that as syntax itself changes, the relationship of the system of computation to meaning changes. Recognising this gives the cognitive theorist something like a second degree of freedom. Cognition might be, to some extent, the manipulation of symbols according to syntactic rules. But it might also involve the changing of of the rules--changing the tacit content of the system of computation. ;The way of studying cognition advocated here promises to incorporate both connectionist and classical cognitive science, and thus undermines the perceived competition between these approaches to cognition.