Computation and its Relevance to Cognition: An Essay on the Foundations of Cognitive Science
Dissertation, University of California, San Diego (
1994)
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Abstract
Is the mind/brain a kind of a computer? In cognitive science, it is widely believed that cognition is a form of computation--that some physical systems, such as minds/brains, compute appropriate functions, whereas other systems, such as video cameras, stomachs or the weather, do not compute. What makes a physical system a computing system? In my dissertation I first reject the orthodox, Turing-machine style answer to this question. I argue that the orthodox notion is rooted in a misunderstanding of our pre-theoretic notion of computation and of Turing's characterization of it. I then offer an alternative--semantic --theory of computation for physical systems. I suggest that to view a system as a computing system is to identify its processes and states, as computational, with respect to their semantic relations to external objects. Lastly, I examine the ramifications of my theses about computation for cognitive science. I argue that the level at which we specify psychological processes/mechanisms is defined over semantic, rather than syntactic or algorithmic, types. As a result of this, I go on to claim that cognitive scientists take semantic properties as those which explain behavior, not those which are in need of explanation