The experience machine and mental state theories of well-being

Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387 (1999)

Abstract

It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is compatible with maintaining that the impact of such values upon our well-being lies in their impact upon our mental lives.

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Jason Kawall
Colgate University

References found in this work

Two Theories of the Good: L. W. SUMNER.L. W. Sumner - 1992 - Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):1-14.

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Citations of this work

The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life.Aaron Smuts - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):536-562.
How to Use the Experience Machine.Eden Lin - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (3):314-332.
Hedonism Reconsidered.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
The Experience Machine.Ben Bramble - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):136-145.
If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?Felipe De Brigard - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.

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