Knowing What to Do: Imagination, Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics

New York: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

Timothy Chappell develops a picture of what philosophical ethics can be like, once set aside from conventional moral theory. His question is 'How are we to know what to do?', and the answer he defends is 'By developing our moral imaginations'--a key part of human excellence, which plays many roles in our practical and evaluative lives

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Chapters

Moral Certainties

This chapter considers, and largely endorses, the thesis that there is no sceptical argument which entails that we don’t know that, for example, murder is bad which is as certain as our knowledge that murder is bad. For some ethical claims—the moral certainties—any reason that might be pro... see more

Why Ethics is Hard

The thesis of this chapter is that one thing that ethics is centrally about is phenomenal contents, experience, and it’s hard to talk about experience. Much important ethical knowledge is knowledge ‘what it’s like’ of the key scenarios and interactions of human life; such knowledge can be ... see more

The Varieties of Knowledge in Plato and Aristotle

This chapter develops the relatively familiar idea of a variety of forms of knowledge: not just propositional knowledge but also knowledge-how and experiential knowledge. It presents arguments against reductive projects aimed at showing that ‘really’ only one of these kinds of knowledge co... see more

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Sophie Grace Chappell
Open University (UK)

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