Philosophy of Science:1-22 (forthcoming)

Authors
Michael T. Stuart
National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University
Abstract
Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.
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DOI 10.1017/psa.2022.31
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References found in this work BETA

True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism.Hasok Chang - 2012 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science.
Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.

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