Abstract

This paper examines the question of whether certainty can be achieved in sciences, according to the principles of empiricism and tries to identify the reasons why Hume was strangely benighted in the mid-eighteenth century by the Franco-Berlin school. The paper argues that Maupertuis’ reading of the Humean conception of causality in his Philosophical Examination of the Proof the Existence of God Employed in the Essay on Cosmology relies upon his criticism of Hume’s thesis on causality. It also suggests that there is a significant link with Quine’s epistemological distinction between conceptual and doctrinal research. That Hume’s thesis was benighted is even stranger considering that both texts were involved in the dissemination of Newtonianism. In this framework, André Charrak studies the true problem of the certainty of the laws of nature and points out that, for an eighteenth-century empiricist, these laws refer to the theoretical laws of mechanics which also originate in the Principia mathematica. The reference to Buffon and D’Alembert serves to support the author’s fundamental thesis that the concept of applying one science to another has been at the heart of Enlightenment’s epistemological empiricism. Advancing an original point of view, Charrak argues that characterizing empiricism through the promotion of an analytical order indicates the influence of Leibniz. Identifying this influence allows to pinpoint the proper distinction between Franco-Berlin empiricism from Humean empiricism.