Cognition, Epistemology, and Reasoning about Evidence within the Legal Domain

Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoria Del Derecho 1 (2):243-264 (2008)
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Abstract

Taking as a point of departure Maturana’s model of cognition, and combining it with his own general approach to the law, which he calls “Legal Constructivism”, the author analyzes the complex dynamics of judicial proof in terms of explaining how judges cognitively process the evidence put forward by the parties during a trial.The author advances the view that judges, just as scientists do, belong to a certain cognitive community, that is, to a certain judicial cognitive community. The main cognitive activities of its members are a combination of cognitive structure-matching procedures and operational closures which are both regulated by the community’s autopoietic rules.Under his analysis, evidence is a cognitive construct. Its symbolic significance and weight is determined by how it fits within the context of a partic- ular set of relations between elements such as the type of disputing parties, the type of claims and arguments made by them, and so forth.Determining if a factual assertion can be considered proven or not under the author’s model is the result of a cognitive operational closure that amounts to take into consideration the dialogical and defeasible carácter of legal argumentation.Resumen:Tomando como punto de partida el modelo del fenómeno de la cognición de Humberto Maturana, y combinándolo con su propia propuesta teórica acerca de cómo entender al derecho (a la que denomina “Constructivismo Jurídico”), el autor analiza la compleja dinámica de la prueba judicial en términos de la manera en que la evidencia que las partes aducen en un juicio es cognitivamente procesada por los jueces.El autor sostiene que, tal como sucede con los científicos, los jueces pertenecen a comunidades cognitivas. Sólo que, en su caso, se trata de comunidades cognitivas judiciales. La principal actividad cognitiva de estas comunidades consiste en una combinación de acoplamientos estructurales y clausura de operaciones cognitivas, las cuales son guiadas por las reglas autopoiéticas de la comunidad en cuestión.En el modelo del autor, la evidencia es un constructo cognitivo, cuyo significado simbólico y peso están determinados por la manera en que la evidencia encaja en un contexto particular de relaciones entre varias clases de elementos, como el tipo de partes en conflicto, el tipo de pretensiones, el tipo de argumentos que ofrecen, etcétera.Determinar si una proposición fáctica puede considerarse probada o no es el resultado de una clausura de operaciones cognitivas, la cual implica tomar en cuenta el carácter dialógico y derrotable de la argumentación jurídica.

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