Lewis Ross
London School of Economics
Legal epistemology has been an area of great philosophical growth since the turn of the century. But recently, a number of philosophers have argued the entire project is misguided, claiming that it relies on an illicit transposition of the norms of individual epistemology to the legal arena. This paper uses these objections as a foil to consider the foundations of legal epistemology, particularly as it applies to the criminal law. The aim is to clarify the fundamental commitments of legal epistemology and suggest a way to vindicate it.
Keywords legal epistemology  legal proof  proof paradox  criminal law  philosophy of law  social epistemology  courts  statistical evidence  standard of proof
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.

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