Abstract

IN THIS paper, following Von Wright, I shall understand practical inferences to be concerned mainly with actions used as means to attain ends. Philosophers from Aristotle to Anscombe and Von Wright have regarded the notion of practical reasoning as crucial from the point of view of understanding rational action and it might further be argued that it is by reference to inductive—theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning that the limits of human rationality are defined; rationality, that is, might be viewed as progress from basic propositions to basic actions. Proceeding from what appears to be a rather austere view of logic, Harman has denied the possibility of either an inductive or a practical logic which leads me to suspect that he would also take a dim view of the notion of "practical inference." Taking what is perhaps a more permissive view, however, and leaving aside problems raised by the notion of an "inductive" logic, I shall follow Kenny, Von Wright, and others in regarding practical inferences as legitimate topics for logical investigation. Whatever may be said in defence of Harman’s views on logic though, I am persuaded that he is mistaken when he writes