Abstract

The aim of this work is to give a basis for acting morally as opposed to exclusively self-interestedly. I draw on both the method and conclusions of Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism to develope an account of objectivity in practical reasoning. This account is applied to egoistic reasoning as characterized by Jesse Kalin, who gives what I believe to be the best defense of egoism to date. By showing that egoistic reasoning as defined by Kalin is lacking in objectivity, I show that by Kalin's own criteria, such reasoning is formally inadequate; and thus insofar as one is concerned to give one's actions an adequate basis, one must adopt a non-egoistic, or moral form of reasoning. ;I further show that egoistic reasoning involves an asymmetry in one's reasoning, that of one's own interests being accorded a certain status necessarily not accorded to others'. This asymmetry is not obvious from the principle that Kalin defends, however, which as universal in form, ranges over all persons. Thus I examine the content of Kalin's non-objective principle to show that only in the case of one's own self-interested actions does it provide one with a reason for approving of such actions. I also examine specific cases, including Kalin's competitive game analogy, to illustrate that approval of others' behavior requires operating on objective standards