Abstract

Toward the completion of this defense, however, an important point emerges: saying whether a agent performed one action or two does not depend upon a set of a priori divisions set forth by the concept of an action. Rather, the divisions are determined by circumstances. It is my position, then, that none of the three major views on individuation is correct, for each assumes that answers to questions concerning the number of actions performed are independent of context. ;One of the more pressing problems to arise recently in the theory of human actions is the individuation of actions. Attempts to distinguish one action from another have resulted in some confusions over important issues in philosophy. They have generated positions which force us to question the role of descriptions in the attribution of causal ties. They have shown the need for a closer look at the mechanics of certain sorts of explanations. They have brought to the surface some perplexing doctrines regarding the temporal span of events. ;This work is concerned with examining endeavors to develop satisfactory accounts of the individuation of actions, endeavors that resulted in the aforementioned confusions. In particular, this work is devoted to an attempt to discover whether any of the theories advanced thus far is correct. These theories comprise three basic views, those represented by Donald Davidson, Alvin Goldman and Judith Thomson. My initial position in this work is to defend Davidson's view against the competing theories