Abstract

In my dissertation, I argue that the causal status of action is an empirical question. Until that question is answered, however, we are justified in using the ordinary notion of action, which includes the idea that agents control their own actions, and which justifies our holding people responsible for their actions. These conclusions are derived from a critical examination of three types of action theories. ;First, I argue that an event-causation model of action has serious problems: It cannot justify our responsibility practices because it is inadequate to the notion of the agent's control of actions. Also, its proponents offer no proof that actions are caused; and causal analyses of the concept of action are ultimately incomplete or circular. However, none of these problems demonstrate that actions cannot have causes. ;I next explain and criticize the agent-causation theory advanced by Richard Taylor and Roderick Chisholm. Though I am sympathetic to their view, I argue that neither their proposed arguments, nor the action-model implied by the theory merits acceptance. Nevertheless, their arguments give provisional justification for accepting the ordinary concept of action. ;Finally, I examine the actionist views of John Macmurray and G. H. von Wright. I criticize Macmurray's theory, especially his key argument that a causal theory of action is self-refuting. I also criticize his and von Wright's claim that causation can be understood only in terms of action. This claim confuses the alleged logical dependence with the actual procedural dependence of causal knowledge upon action. ;My concluding chapter explains how the shortcomings of these three theories indicate that the causal status of actions is an empirical question: Each theory assumes, without proof, an answer to that question. I also argue here that there would remain ample justification for moral responsibility if future evidence should establish a causal view of action