Consistency, possibility, and Gödel: a reply to Pruss

Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3671-3677 (2022)
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Abstract

Alexander Pruss has given a quick argument against the claim that consistency is possibility using Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. The argument does not distinguish metalanguage claims of consistency from object-language ones, rendering it unsound.

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10.1007/s11098-022-01842-1

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Computability and Logic.George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):520-521.
Possibility is not consistency.Alexander R. Pruss - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2341-2348.

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