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Kaave Lajevardi
University of Toronto, St. George Campus (PhD)
  1.  92
    On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - 2019 - Theoria 85 (1):8-17.
    We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: "the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true".
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  2.  97
    There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (2):278–287.
    We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about *the* Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.
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  3.  37
    What He Could Have Said (but Did Not Say) About Gödel’s Second Theorem: A Note on Floyd-Putnam’s Wittgenstein.Kaave Lajevardi - 2021 - Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1):121-129.
    In several publications, Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam have argued that the so-called ‘notorious paragraph’ of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics contains a valuable philosophical insight about Gödel’s informal proof of the first incompleteness theorem – in a nutshell, the idea they attribute to Wittgenstein is that if the Gödel sentence of a system is refutable, then, because of the resulting ω-inconsistency of the system, we should give up the translation of Gödel’s sentence by the English sentence “I (...)
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  4. Kripke and the Dogmatism Paradox.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscript
    I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I deal (...)
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  5. Laws and Counterfactuals: Defusing an Argument Against the Humean View of Laws.Kaave Lajevardi - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (4):751-758.
    ABSTRACT: Appealing to the failure of counterfactual support is a standard device in refuting a Humean view on laws of nature: some true generalisations do not support relevant counterfactuals; therefore not every true general fact is a law of nature—so goes the refutation. I will argue that this strategy does not work, for our understanding of the truth-value of any counterfactual is grounded in our understanding of the lawhood of some statements related to it.
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  6. Transworld Identity as a Problem for Essentialism About Kinds.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscript
    Essentialism about natural kinds involves talking about kinds across possible worlds. I argue that there is a non-trivial transworld identity problem here, which cannot be (dis)solved in the same way that Kripke treats the corresponding transworld identity problem for individuals. -/- I will briefly discuss some ideas for a solution. The upshot is scepticism concerning natural-kind essentialism.
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  7.  1
    De-Modalizing the Language.Kaave Lajevardi - 2021 - In Mojtaba Mojtahedi, Shahid Rahman & MohammadSaleh Zarepour (eds.), Mathematics, Logic, and Their Philosophies: Essays in Honour of Mohammad Ardeshir. Springer. pp. 391-409.
    With the aim of providing an empiricist-friendly rational reconstruction of scientists’ modal talk, I represent and defend the following unoriginal idea of relative modalities, focused on natural ones: the assertion of physical necessityPhysical necessity of φ can be understood as the logical provability of φ from the background theoryBackground theory of the context of assertion. I elaborate on my conception of the background theoryBackground theory, and reply to a number of objections, among which an objection concerning the failure of factivityFactivity.
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