On the Arithmetical Truth of Self‐Referential Sentences

Theoria 85 (1):8-17 (2019)
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Abstract

We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: "the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true".

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References found in this work

Self-reference in arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.
On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
On Gödel Sentences and What They Say.Peter Milne - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):193-226.
On “seeing” the truth of the Gödel sentence.George Boolos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):655-656.

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