Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435 (2006)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, and so try to accommodate these intuitions even on an invariantist view. DeRose (Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 1998; Philosophical Review, 2002) argues that any such 'warranted assertibility manoeuvre', or 'WAM', against contextualism is unlikely to succeed. Here, I argue that his objections to a WAM against contextualism are not persuasive and offer a pragmatic account of the data about ascriptions of knowledge.
|
Keywords | Cohen Contextualism DeRose warranted assertibility manoeuvres |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-004-5747-3 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 51 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them).Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):170-185.
The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.
On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
View all 90 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith DeRose - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
Contextualism and Warranted Assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.
Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Cambridge MA: Mit Press. pp. 85-104.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
345 ( #30,566 of 2,520,901 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #270,438 of 2,520,901 )
2009-01-28
Total views
345 ( #30,566 of 2,520,901 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #270,438 of 2,520,901 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads