Abstract

Keith DeRose defends contextualism: the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions vary with the context of the ascriber. Mark Richard has criticised contextualism for being unable to vindicate intuitions about disagreement. To account for these intuitions, DeRose has proposed truth-conditions for “knows” called the Gap view. According to this view, knowledge ascriptions are true iff the epistemic standards of each conversational participant are met, false iff each participant's standards aren't met, and truth-valueless otherwise. An implication of the Gap view is that people with divergent standards can enter conversations and thereby render knowledge claims gappy. We characterise this as a form of trolling. We argue that trolling results in unacceptably counterintuitive implications and that this constitutes a reductio against the Gap view. We also briefly explore the implications of trolling for other contextualist views about “knows,” as well as a broader class of context sensitive expressions.