Pritchard, Revisionism and Warranted Assertability

Acta Analytica 31 (4):439-454 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Against contextualism, Duncan Pritchard has argued that conversational pragmatics give rise to an argument in favour of invariantist neoMooreanism. More specifically, he argues that when we conjoin a Moorean view with a warranted assertability manoeuvre, we can satisfy our pretheoretical intuitions (which are decidedly invariantist), whereas contextualists cannot. In the following paper, I challenge Pritchard’s argument and contend that he is too quick to declare victory for invariantism, for not only does the WAM he employs appear to be ad hoc vis-à-vis DeRose’s plausible criteria, but it also seems to have very implausible pragmatic implications when subjected to close scrutiny.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Constructive logic, truth and warranted assertability.Greg Restall - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):474-483.
Warranted assertability maneuvers and the rules of assertion.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.
Classic invariantism, relevance and warranted assertability manœvres.Tim Black - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336.
WAMs: Why Worry?Peter Baumann - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.
John Dewey's Theory of Warranted Assertability.Irving Sosensky - 1955 - Dissertation, Columbia University
Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding.Gordon Steinhoff - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.
A Puzzle about Warrant.Duncan Pritchard - 2001 - Philosophical Inquiry 23 (1-2):59-71.
Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Mit Press. pp. 85-104.
The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.
Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Knowledge, certainty, and assertion.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):293-299.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-27

Downloads
45 (#311,164)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nathan Cockram
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Epistemological disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.

View all 15 references / Add more references