In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-124 (2020)

Authors
Ingo Brigandt
University of Alberta
Esther Rosario
Dartmouth College
Abstract
Examining previous discussions on how to construe the concepts of gender and race, we advocate what we call strategic conceptual engineering. This is the employment of a (possibly novel) concept for specific epistemic or social aims, concomitant with the openness to use a different concept (e.g., of race) for other purposes. We illustrate this approach by sketching three distinct concepts of gender and arguing that all of them are needed, as they answer to different social aims. The first concept serves the aim of identifying and explaining gender-based discrimination. It is similar to Haslanger’s well-known account, except that rather than offering a definition of ‘woman’ we focus on ‘gender’ as one among several axes of discrimination. The second concept of gender is to assign legal rights and social recognitions, and thus is to be trans-inclusive. We argue that this cannot be achieved by previously suggested concepts that include substantial gender-related psychological features, such as awareness of social expectations. Instead, our concept counts someone as being of a certain gender solely based on the person’s self-identification with this gender. The third concept of gender serves the aim of personal empowerment by means of one’s gender identity. In this context, substantial psychological features and awareness of one’s social situation are involved. While previous accounts of concepts have focused on their role in determining extensions, we point to contexts where a concept’s role in explanation and moral reasoning can be more important.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.

View all 83 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Post-Truth Conceptual Engineering.Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1–16.
The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections.Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1122-1145.
Defective Food Concepts.Andrea Borghini, Nicola Piras & Beatrice Serini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12225-12249.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Dispositional Account of Gender.Jennifer McKitrick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2575-2589.
Gender Identity Disorder.Jennifer McKitrick - 2007 - In Harold Kincaid & Jennifer McKitrick (eds.), Establishing Medical Reality. Springer. pp. 137-48.
Трансцендентное Пространство Гендера.Volodymyr V. Khmel & O. M. Korkh - 2014 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 5:69-76.
Трансцендентное Пространство Гендера.Volodymyr V. Khmel & O. M. Korkh - 2014 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 5:69-76.
Gender Concepts and Intuitions.Mari Mikkola - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):559-583.
A Probe Into Social Sex.Ya-jun Qu - 2006 - Nankai University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 6:11-15.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-12-11

Total views
594 ( #13,925 of 2,504,875 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
77 ( #10,271 of 2,504,875 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes