High-stakes decisions do not require narrative conviction but narrative flexibility

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e85 (2023)
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Abstract

We challenge Johnson et al.'s assumption that people reduce unclear situations to a single narrative explanation and that such reduction would be adaptive for decision-making under radical uncertainty. Instead, we argue that people imagine and maintain multiple narrative possibilities throughout the decision-making process and that this process provides cognitive flexibility and adaptive benefits within the proposed model.

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