Abstract

In this project I develop a theory of collective agency for Kantian social contract theory . Contractualists lack a unified, coherent theory of agency. At some points they endorse an individualistic theory of the agent. Elsewhere they recognize the possibility of collective agents, but they never take seriously the concept of an irreducibly collective agent. ;Contractualism makes more sense, and can better achieve its own goals, if reinterpreted in terms of a theory of agency which avoids these equivocations. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics and action theory, I define the agent as an entity with the capacity to exhibit patterns of intention and concern. This theory accommodates both individual and collective agents. I present theories of practical reasoning, welfare, and autonomy for agents so defined. I revise contractualism in terms of this non-individualistic theory of agency. The central modification specifies that a party in Rawls' hypothetical choice situation should represent an agent, simpliciter, without any presumption that this agent is coextensive with a single human being. ;This revision generates challenging political implications. I conclude that it would not be unjust, in principle, for the state to require higher levels of individual self-sacrifice for the sake of the less fortunate than even egalitarian liberals traditionally support. At the very least, a coherent contractualism presents no principled objection to the state's taking the firm public position that justice imposes a higher level of mutual responsibility than we have historically understood ourselves to have. There may be decisive practical reasons for the state to exercise caution in this regard, but justice has no complaint